Roadmap – Tim O’Keefe – Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?

 

 

O'Keefe's paper is concerned with rectifying apparently contradictory passages from what he takes to be the Epicurean corpus. O'Keefe says that many passages indicate and endorsement of psychological and ethical egoism and hedonism. This view is in opposition to others such as Mistis and Annas.

Mistis and Annas say that the problematic passages indicate an inconsistency in Epicurean ethics, altruism being incommensurate (in their view) with egoism.

O'Keefe rejects the diagnosis of inconsistency. He believes altruism is not implied by the passages and can be accounted for in terms of egoism alone.

Basic Structure of the Paper

Six Sections

1. Sharpening the title question. What do we mean by "altruistic", and what are the problematic passages?
   
2. General argument for a strictly egoistic reading of the Epicurean corpus.
   
3. Explanation of why friendship is valuable in egoistic Epicureanism.
   
4. Textual reconciliation: SV23
   
5. Textual reconciliation: DF 1
   
6. Textual reconciliation: other problematic passages, especially "die for a friend".
   

 

 

Part 1: Egoism and Altruism in Epicurus

The normal definition of altruism means some sort of psychological and/or ethical self-sacrificing. Epicureanism must reject this conception right away.

Mistis defines Epicurean altruism as "showing disinterested concern for one's friends."

O'Keefe rejects this reading also. With respect to the notion of altruism, he asks this central question: Is Epicurean friendship purely self-regarding, or is there any other-regarding element in it?

He notes that Aristotle has a ready way out of this problem. For Aristotle, friendship is a part of my own happiness. Aristotelian friendship might be self-interested, but it is not purely self-regarding.

Self-Regarding: Compatible with egocentrism and egoism. Self-interested. No value beyond instrumentality.

Other-Regarding: Compatible with self-interest and egocentrism, but not with egoism. Recognizes value beyond instrumentality.

O'Keefe argues that unlike Aristotelian friendship, Epicurean friendship must be purely self-regarding.

He notes Hume's criticism of Epicurean ethics:

"…every virtue or friendship is attended by a secret pleasure; whence they conclude that friendship and virtue could not be disinterested. But the fallacy is obvious: The virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel pleasure in doing good for my friends because I love him; but I do not love him for the sake of that pleasure."

But I don't see how Epicurus necessarily commits the fallacy Hume charges him with. Why do we assume, first of all, that the pleasure attended by friendship and virtue is "secret"? Why can't it be a shared pleasure? Pleasure for Epicurus is ataraxia and aponia, which do not necessarily have to be personal. Sitting quietly in the garden with a friend, my peace of mind is your peace of mind, we share in the tranquility.

O'Keefe says that for Epicurus, I love the friends for the sake of the pleasure that I get from him. There is no immediate linking of the friend or desire for his own good.

 

 

Part 2: Why to Presume that Epicurean Friendship is Egoistic

O'Keefe begins by pointing to the general egoism that runs throughout Epicurean ethics and psychology. Cites Cicero's Torquatus in DF 1 23. Again, note that these are later, hostile sources. Nevertheless, says O'Keefe, the passages as they stand can be consistently reconciled with Epicurean, self-regarding egoism.

 

Part 3: Why is Friendship Valuable for Epicureans?

Security (freedom, self-sufficiency, etc.), both physical and intellectual. Protection from danger.

Helps to cultivate ataraxia and aponia.

 

Part 4: Is Friendship Intrinsically Valuable?

This section deals with SV23.

O'Keefe says Mistis makes SV23 the cornerstone of his interpretation, and Annas takes it as evidence that Epicurean friends feel "genuine other-concern."

O'Keefe rejects this "other-regardingness" because of the incoherence it introduces; incoherence which he thinks can be avoided on the strictly egoistic reading.

He offers 3 ways of reconciling the text to avoid the incoherence:

1. FIP thesis – Friendship is Inherently Pleasant. Notes that the passage says "friendship" not "friend." Friendship can be both a kinetic and a katastematic pleasure. The problem with this view is that it is not directly evidenced by the text. FIP thesis does not fit will with the first account of friendship given by Torquatus in DF 1. It fits better with the second account of DF 1 (the distributed fondness account), but it doesn't fit with the orthodox account. Moreover, the objects of desire are, for Epicurus, not choice-worthy for their own sake; only ataraxia and aponia are. There is also the fact that for Epicurus mental pleasures are based on physical pleasures (again, this is only evidenced in hostile sources).
   
2. FCA thesis – Friendship is a Component of Ataraxia. Suggested to reconcile SV23 with egoism. Attributed to Evans. Ataraxia is intrinsically valuable, though it might depend on aponia. Ataraxia is a psychic state of an individual, says Evans, and security and trust are essential parts of this psychic state.
   
3. Assigning SV23 to the "timid" later Epicureans. While FIP and FCA are both plausible (FCA more so than FIP), it is nevertheless unnecessary to postulate these theses if SV23 is not a legitimate part of the Epicurean corpus. Seems ad hoc, but we know not all the SV are from Epicurus himself, many are from later Epicureans. Again, O'Keefe cites Cicero's Torquatus in DF as evidence. Since attributing SV23 to Epicurus makes him inconsistent, and some SV are from writers other than Epicurus himself, and we in fact know that there was a group of later Epicureans who would have endorsed SV23, then we can justifiably say that SV23 was likely not original to Epicurus.
   

So Epicurus is egoistic. There are three ways of reconciling SV23. All of these ways are more plausible than the altruistic reading. SV23 is most likely later Epicureans. And even if it is Epicurus, the charge of inconsistency is handled by the FIP thesis and/or the FCA thesis.

 

Part 5: DF 1 – Egoistically loving your friend as much as you love yourself.

First O'Keefe looks at the first account of friendship given by Torquatus in DF 1. Three reasons why the passage is worth looking at:

1. Extended argument given, not just aphorisms.
   
2. One of the most altruistic of Epicurean passages.
   
3. Original, orthodox view. Not revisionist.
   

 

The argument runs:

1. Friend's pleasures are not desired by us as much as our own, but
   
2. Friendship is necessary for attaining the greatest pleasure for ourselves.
   
3. Friendship requires us to love our friends equally to ourselves, on egoistic grounds.
   
4. Therefore, the wise man will feel exactly the same toward his fiend as toward himself, exert as much for his friend's pleasure as his own.
   

 

1. Seeming problems:
   

• Appears to be internal contradiction
  
• Must be either equal or not equal, cannot be both (LNC).
  
• So is it possible on egoistic grounds to cultivate a disinterested love of others?
  
• This would not strictly speaking be a contradiction, buyt it would certainly be psychologically tricky.
  
• No, says O'Keefe. The egoistic motive undercuts disinterested love. It makes in not genuine. This is Cicero's objection, given in DF 2 78.
  
• The Epicurean sage here suffers from a case of doublethink.
  
• So, either the position describes inconsistent ends or inconsistent motives.
  

  
   

1. Reasons internal to the passage for egoism.
   

• Principal of charity demands that we not attribute a blatant contradiction within the first two lines of the argument.
  
• "All that has been said about the essential connection of the virtues with pleasure must be repeated about friendship." Says Torquatus, DF 1 68.
  
• Comparison suggests that friendship, like virtue, is only valuable instrumentally.
  
• Friendship, however, cannot be divorced from pleasure.
  
• There may be "other-regardingness" psychologically, but not ethically.
  
• Strong contrast with first account.
  

 

1. Reconciliation: How to love others equally as oneself on egoistic grounds.
   

• How do we reconcile equal valuing with non-equal valuing? The first demands other-regarding, while the second demands self-regarding.
  
• O'Keefe offers a psychological behavioral account. Indirect egoism. What is expressed in (2) and (4) is a policy of action, not desire.
  

Desires are egoistically determined, but actions are determined by desires.