Roadmap - Can Epicureans Be Friends –Matthew Evans

Evans says that Epicureans can be friends, but only if they are motivated by directly-egoistic hedonism. They can neither be altruistic, nor indirectly-egoistic; and they must reject the so-called valuation-condition of friendship, on pain of contradiction.

 

Part 1 – Negative Argument:

In the first half of the paper, Evans argues against epicurean friendship being altruistic, indirectly-egoistic, and against accepting the valuation-condition.

The valuation- condition is as follows: if X is a friend of Y, then X values Y's well-being for its, or Y's, own sake.

If this valuation-condition is not rejected, then a contradiction obtains in the textual evidence (wrecking the whole ethical system). Accepting the valuation-condition yields contradictions between two groups, the first supporting egoistic hedonism, the second supporting philophilia (Evans' word) or loving friends equally to yourself.

Here is a breakdown of the textual evidence Evan's presents as conflicting (and contradicting in the case of a positive valuation-condition):

Egoistic Hedonism	Philophilia
Cicero. De Finibus .i 42, cf. i 30, I 54 Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus, 128	Vatican Saying 23 Vatican Saying 52 Vatican Saying 78 Authorized Doctrine 27 Cicero. De Finibus. i 66-68, i 82.

 

Altruism (accepting the valuation-condition) is rejected by textual evidence. Evans says that the only two sources that would seem to endorse the valuation-condition are SV 23 and De Fin. i 66-68. Evan's believes that neither of these sources is enough to support endorsing the valuation-condition.

SV 23: "Every friendship is choice-worthy in itself, but has its origin in benefit."

Alternative translation: "Every friendship is a virtue in itself, but has its origin in benefit."

Note that with either translation, it says "friendship" not "friend".

But I get the sense that SV23 is yet another metaphor for growth. All trees have their origin in seeds (as does everything that grows and decays). This is the importance of the Garden.

De Finibus i66-68, ii82: Reconstructed Argument:

1. Stable and lasting enjoyment of life requires friendship.
   
2. Friendship requires loving your friends as you love yourself.
   
3. Friendship leads to sharing equally in friend's pleasures and pains.
   
4. Therefore the wise will feel the same way about their friends as they do about themselves. They undertake the same effort to secure their friend's pleasure as their own.
   

Evans says premises (1) and (2) contradict direct-egoistic hedonism, so they must be modified (otherwise it wrecks the whole epicurean ethical system).

O'Keefe says the word "love" in (2) and the word "feel" in (4) are to be read in terms not of evaluation, but in terms of psychological behavior. He says this reading is supported philologically.

On this reading, (2) and (4) don't need to imply anything about what the wise-man values and therefore (2) do not create a conflict with the egoism.

Therefore the reconstructed argument from De Finibus i66-68, ii82, must be read behaviorally.

But there are two kinds of behavioral readings:

1. Indirect Egoism - The sage adopts the friend's good as an ultimate practical end, independent of, yet equal to his own.
   
2. Direct Egoism - The sage adopts only his own good as an ultimate practical end, but discovers via deliberation that his own good stands or falls equally with his friend's.
   

Evans says that epicureans must be direct-egoists.

Note that the dispute between (i) and (ii) is over the content of the sage's principles. Both (i) and (ii) agree that the sage will behave so as to help his friends; they disagree about the practical reasoning that moves the sage to behave in such a way. Thus (i) and (ii) are, as far as anyone could objectively tell, behaviorally identical.

Evans says KD25 and Ep. Men. 128 are textual evidence against indirect theories of any kind, including indirect-egoism.

But Evans' reading of KD25 and Ep.Men.128 assumes that "the natural goal" and "pleasure" always refer to the sage's personal, egoistic natural goal and pleasure. Why not refer to the natural goal of BOTH friends, as a single social unit? Or even to the friend's own natural goal or pleasure?

Evans presents the following argument to rule out indirect-egoism.

1. All action is directed by the "natural goal" of my own ego.
   
2. If action is not directed by my natural goal, then my actions will not accord with my reasoning.
   
3. Therefore, indirect egoism is ruled out.
   

 

Part 2:

So up to this point, Evans has argued that if epicurean friendship is to have any hope at all, and not be contrary to the whole epicurean ethical system, then it must be understood in terms of strict direct-egoistic hedonism. Having negatively established this much, Evans goes on to offer a positive direct egoist justification for epicurean friendship.

Evans notes that the direct egoist view seems to fly in the face of lots of textual evidence. He lists the following:

• SV28
  
• D.L x121
  
• SV 56-57
  
• Plutarch, Against Epicurean Happiness. 1097A = Usener 544
  
• Plutarch, Against Colates. 1111B = Usener 546
  
• SV 44
  
• SV 15
  
• Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus. 135
  
• Seneca. E.M 19.10 = Usener 542
  

Evans admits that his positive account must insist that direct egoistic hedonists must treat each other in the ways described in all of this textual evidence.

Evans says much of this behavior on the part of the direct egoistic hedonist can be understood in terms of security.

Epicurus distinguishes between the value of the goods themselves and the value of confidence in the availability of these goods.

Evidence for this is in SV 34. It is the trust that is the most important part.

Without trust there is no friendship.

Trust is based on epicurean conception of justice (natural social contract to do no harm).

In order to avoid a general collapse of trust among all of one's friends, one cannot be a free rider and cut and run from the obligations of a particular friendship when it means pain for you.

The positive account must admit that friendships can survive a one-way breakdown of trust.

X need not trust Y, X need only trust that by helping Y that X will be helped.

Sounds like a political friendship to me. Quid pro quo.

This problem is solved by nesting particular friendships in a broader community of friends (to fall back on in case some friendships turn out not to be genuine).

Textual evidence for this view comes from SV28 and SV39

Epicureans must be emotionally engaged with friends, but SV 66 indicates sympathy based not on "mournful lamentation", but rather, "practical reflection."

"Trust" is what is of essential importance in friendship, trust that is valued directly-egoistically for its hedonic property of engendering ataraxia.

The sage feels not "pain" but "concern."

Therefore epicurean friendship must, if it is consistent, be directly egoistically hedonic, and must reject the valuation-condition.